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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the role of ideology in Soviet economic 
reform programs. Three major economic initiatives in which worker cooperatives were 
designed to play a leading role in transforming the Soviet economy will be examined for 
similarities and differences: the New Economic Policy (NEP), the collectivization 
campaign, and the perestroika project.
To establish a common frame of reference for comparison of the three economic 
programs, the thesis will begin with a survey of literature on the uses of ideology by 
Communist regimes. The writings of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin on cooperatives will 
also be studied to develop further the conceptual framework for analysis.
After this background information has been provided, the actual cooperative 
strategies of Nikolai Bukharin during the NEP, Josef Stalin during the collectivization 
drive, and Mikhail Gorbachev during the perestroika program will be investigated. The 
motivations of each leader for introducing co-operative reform and the ways in which each 
one used ideology to introduce and implement his policy will be distinguished.
Analysis of the three programs will yield insights into the process and aims of 
Soviet reform. First, Soviet leaders do often turn to Marxism-Leninism for guidance when 
devising strategies for economic renewal. Second, ideology is also used by Soviet leaders 
to justify economic policies to Party members and to encourage popular support for and 
participation in reform campaigns. Finally, it is evident that only the programs of Bukharin 
and Gorbachev represent sincere attempts to execute the will of Marx and Lenin concerning 
the promotion of voluntary cooperatives and market socialism.
The Role of Ideology in Soviet Economic Reform:
A Comparison of the NEP, the Collectivization Campaign, 
and the Perestroika Program
INTRODUCTION
Since Vladimir Ilyich Lenin led the Bolshevik Party to power in 1917, Western 
analysts have pondered what considerations guide Soviet leaders in the making of policy. 
Throughout much of the post-war era, many of these analysts had concurred that 
Marxism-Leninism was the single most important factor in Soviet policy-making.1 In the 
eyes of these kremlinologists, Soviet leaders from Lenin onward had attempted to build a 
Communist society by following an ideological blueprint which had changed very little 
since 1917.
However, according to many of these same Soviet observers, Mikhail Gorbachev 
has largely discarded ideology as a policy-making consideration, and, in fact, has 
abandoned Marxism-Leninism.2 Primarily, they cite Gorbachev’s extensive efforts to 
institutionalize market mechanisms and democratic forces as proof that he has tacitly 
renounced the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. These analysts further assert 
that Gorbachev will either transform the CPSU into a weakened Western European-style 
socialist party, or will be toppled by more conservative forces within the Party.3 A closer 
look at the nature of ideology and the Soviet experience, however, yields markedly 
different conclusions from those reached by the Western scholars discussed above. Such a 
thorough examination of the historical development of Marxism-Leninism in the USSR 
reveals that Soviet leaders have not been averse to adapting ideology to changing material 
circumstances, especially during reform campaigns designed to promote economic 
liberalization and political decentralization. Further, this sort of critique suggests that a 
strong case can be made for the argument that Josef Stalin perverted many of the Marxist
2
3ideals and programs espoused by the original Bolsheviks, including Lenin. Also, this type 
of analysis indicates that Gorbachev sought to revitalize the CPSU and the USSR by re­
introducing Lenin’s later writings on Soviet socialism and by devising strategies for 
contemporary socialist development which were predicated on the theories and 
recommendations for Soviet growth conceived by the first Soviet leader.
In this essay, such an examination of the evolution of Soviet ideology will be 
undertaken. While it would be extremely interesting to analyze how various Soviet leaders 
have interpreted Marxism- Leninism and applied their theoretical understanding to the 
gamut of activities that the CPSU attempts to control, it is simply not practical to do so in a 
thesis of this sort. Instead, the focus of this study will be restricted to the investigation of 
the ideological justifications for policies concerning cooperative enterprises given by Soviet 
leaders during three different economic campaigns: the New Economic Policy (NEP), the 
collectivization drive, and the perestroika program.
However, in order to familiarize the reader with concepts essential to understanding 
Soviet ideology, it will be necessary to provide a broad overview of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology in chapter one. Next, in chapter two, Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) will 
be thoroughly analyzed from an ideological standpoint. Then, Stalin’s forced 
collectivization program will be examined in terms of its fidelity to Marxist-Leninist ideals 
and its long-term effect on the Soviet economy in chapter three. Finally, in chapter four, 
Gorbachev’s attempts, prior to the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), to reinvigorate Soviet cooperatives through an ideological campaign 
will be studied.
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CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVIEW OF IDEOLOGY
Definition and Functions of Ideology
Before examining what role Marxism-Leninism plays in Soviet society, it is 
necessary to define ideology in general terms. In Politics in the Communist World, Leslie 
Holmes, provides such a definition. According to Holmes, any ideology has the following 
three characteristics. First, ideology is a set of largely unverifiable beliefs. Second, it 
performs socially necessary functions for the group promoting it. Finally, the group 
advocating the particular ideology must be organizing, or have organized, itself.1
After offering this definition, Holmes identifies seven functions which ideology 
serves in Communist societies: legitimation, motivation, justification, activation, 
communication, socialization, and limitation.2 One of the most important of these functions 
to ruling Communist parties is certainly legitimation, because in the absence of genuine 
multi-party elections, these governments have to rely on Marxism-Leninism as the political 
rationale for their rule. Concerning the policy-making process, ideology is both a source 
of inspiration for Communist leaders and a means of justifying their decisions. Further, 
these leaders seek to energize, or activate, the masses to carry out particular policies 
through the use of ideology.3
Communist authorities also utilize Marxism-Leninism to build long-term societal 
commitment to socialist ideals, a process which Western political scientists refer to as 
“socialization.” Consequently, Marxist-Leninist phraseology becomes essential in the 
communication between the people, concerning their needs and frustrations, and the
5
6Communist government, regarding its expectations and capabilities. Finally, the 
Communist parties’ attempts to inculcate proletarian values into their people combined with 
the gradual development of a common socialist language results in the creation of self- 
imposed limits on what actions can be considered compatible with Marxism-Leninism.4
The Enduring Components of Marxism-Leninism
Having defined and identified the functions of ideology in Communist societies in 
general, it is now possible to examine the essence of Marxism-Leninism in Soviet society 
in particular. Because Marxism-Leninism has been interpreted in widely different ways by 
both Western scholars and Soviet leaders, it is necessary to identify the base upon which 
all, or at least most, of these divergent interpretations have been predicated. This can best 
be accomplished by looking separately at the contributions made by Marx and Lenin which 
have gone virtually unchallenged since the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917.
Marx provided Lenin and the original Bolsheviks with a scientific method for 
studying societal development, a thorough critique of the existing capitalist order, and a 
general strategy for socialist revolution. According to Marx, societies were universally 
subject to his theory of historical materialism, which asserted that a given society’s stage of 
historical development was determined by the relationship between the means of production 
and the relations of production. (In Marxist terminology, the means of production is 
equivalent to the technology and labor power necessary to make goods, while the relations 
of production refers to the relationship between the owners of the means of production and 
the common workers, who actually produce the goods.) Further, Marx posited that a given 
society’s progression along his self-defined ladder of historical development occurred only 
when the means of production evolved at a greater rate than the relations of production, 
which resulted in the revolutionary overthrow of one class by another.5
7Marx devoted much of his life to analyzing the capitalist phase of development, 
which the US and most of Western Europe were undergoing in the mid-1800s. He 
concluded that the preoccupation with profit accumulation displayed by the bourgeoisie, the 
owners of the means of production, combined with the ever-increasing exploitation of the 
proletariat inevitably would lead to socialist revolution. The proletariat would triumph 
ultimately, and then would form a collective dictatorship, socialize the means of 
production, and abolish class distinctions. Eventually, this dictatorship would wither 
away, and man would live harmoniously with one another, guided by the dictate, “From 
each according to his ability to each according to his need.”6
One of Marx’s conceptions concerning the socialization of the means of production 
which deserves special attention because of the focus of this paper is that of cooperative 
ownership. Defining cooperation as “the form of labor of many persons, methodically 
working together and alongside one another in the same production process or in related 
production processes,” Marx expressed great optimism in the socialist potential of 
cooperatives.7 He first spoke of the benefits of cooperatives in two essays that he wrote in 
collaboration with Ernest Jones, a British socialist and journalist in 1851.
In their essays, Marx and Jones posited that cooperatives provided their members 
with a more equitable distribution of assets than did capitalist firms. However, the two 
authors also asserted that cooperatives were not as socially useful as they could be because 
they competed with, and absorbed, other co-operatives, and because capitalist institutions 
conspired to create many obstacles for the cooperatives such as steep taxation, restrictive 
land transfer laws, and high-cost export procedures. Therefore, Marx and Jones 
concluded that cooperation needed to be expanded on a nationwide scale and that political 
power had to be seized by the proletariat before a socialist society could be constructed.8
8Marx elaborated on this conception in several other works and speeches, with his
most impassioned defense of cooperation being delivered in his “Inaugural Address of the
Working Men’s International Association.” In this speech, Marx said:
%
The value of these great social experiments (cooperatives) cannot be 
overrated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that 
production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern 
science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters 
employing a class of hands.. .To save the industrious masses, 
cooperative labor ought to be developed to national dimensions, and, 
consequently, to be fostered by national means.9
From this quote, it is again apparent that Marx believed that cooperative enterprises 
should play a crucial role in the development of socialist societies. Marx also urged that 
cooperatives be given a central role in the creation of socialist society in some of his later 
works. In “Critique of the Gotha Program,” Marx asserted that a socialist society should 
be a “cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production.”10 
In Capital, he re-iterated this thought when he stated that the means of production should be 
“in the hands of associated producers (i.e., cooperatives).”11 Finally, in a letter to Vera 
Zasulich, a Russian populist, Marx wrote that because peasant cooperatives existed on a 
nation-wide scale in Russia, it was possible for these cooperatives to “develop directly into 
an element of socialist production” if they could “gradually shake off (their) 
primitive quailities. Friedrich Engels, the co-founder of scientific socialism, further 
elaborated on the development of co-operatives in several of his works. In The Origin o f 
the Family, Private Property, and the State, Engels wrote that socialist society would 
“recognize production on the basis of a free and equal association of producers.”13 Engels 
provided another important clarification of Marxist thought concerning the voluntary nature 
of cooperatives in “The Peasant Question in France and Germany.” In this article,
Engels stated:
9When we are in possession of state power, we shall not even think of 
expropriating the small peasants.. .Our task relative to the small peasants 
consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private 
enterprise and private possession into cooperating ones, not forcibly but 
by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose.14
This quote reflects both the importance which Marx and Engels felt that the encouragement 
and formation of cooperatives in the early days of a socialist government should be given, 
and their belief that this goal should not be accomplished through coercion.
Accepting the validity of Marx’s theory of historical materialism, critique of 
capitalism, and prophesy of socialist revolution, Lenin sought to “update” Marxism to 
reflect changes in material circumstances which had occurred since Marx’s death in 1883. 
Specifically, Lenin developed two theories to explain why socialist revolution had not yet 
manifested itself and to propose what new economic conditions and revolutionary strategies 
were necessary for a socialist seizure of power. It is worthwhile to study briefly these 
theories on imperialism and a Communist vanguard since they were critical to Lenin’s 
ideological justification of the establishment of socialism in Russia and to the claims of 
subsequent Communist leaders about the ideological legitimacy of creating socialism in 
nations which, like czarist Russia, had not experienced advanced capitalism.
Lenin provided his explanation for why Marx’s prediction of socialist revolution 
had yet to be fulfilled in Imperialism, The Highest Stage o f Capitalism. In this book, Lenin 
argued that large industrial-financial monopolies in the most developed countries had been 
able to postpone socialist overthrow in their native lands by modestly improving the 
proletariat’s standard of living and by bribing labor leaders not to organize large, 
coordinated strikes. According to Lenin, the monopolies obtained the funds necessary to 
pursue this two-pronged strategy from profits they derived from large-scale exporting 
activities to less developed countries.15
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However, Lenin asserted that this type of capital export actually contained the seeds for 
socialist revolution. He theorized that armed conflict between the most advanced capitalist 
countries would inevitably arise because of the insatiable desire of their national 
monopolies for new markets in which to invest their capital and the finite number of 
exploitable territories. Lenin further prophesied that these warring imperialists would cause 
many other nations to become involved in their hostilities.16 In Lenin’s view, it was 
during such a time of worldwide crisis that the chances were best for a socialist revolution 
to be executed successfully in a country which had just entered the capitalist epoch.17
Specifically, Lenin figured that the strains of an international war would exacerbate 
the suffering of the masses of a newly created capitalist state to the point where they would 
protest in large numbers. According to Lenin’s revolutionary plan, it would then be the 
responsibility of a well-organized Communist Party to form an alliance of the different 
protesting groups, which would consist primarily of the proletariat and the peasantry.
Lenin predicted that this coalition would seize power from the bourgeoisie government 
whose attention and resources had been largely expended on the war. Finally, Lenin 
posited that once this overthrow had been achieved, the Communist vanguard would begin 
to build socialism within the country.18
To Lenin, the development of a national network of cooperatives was an essential
element of this building process. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, Lenin
immediately expressed his belief in the socialist potential for cooperatives. In “The
Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Lenin wrote:
The socialist state can arise only as a network of producers’ and 
consumers’ cooperatives, which conscientiously keep account of their 
production and consumption, economize on labor, and steadily raise the 
productivity of labor.19
Thus, with this quote, Lenin indicated that he did not intend to centralize the economy and
11
impose quotas for all enterprises as the first economic policy of the Soviet government.
Even after the exigencies of civil war had forced Lenin to create a command
economy, he still advocated that cooperatives be given the Party’s blessings. At the Eighth
Congress of the Russian Communist Party, which was held in March of 1919, Lenin
asserted that cooperatives needed to be highly encouraged by the Party, and allowed to
conduct their own affairs.20 In that same year Lenin proclaimed:
No Communist, no intelligent socialist, has even entertained the idea of 
violence against the middle peasants. All socialists have always spoken 
of agreement with them and of their gradual and voluntary transition 
to socialism.21
Considering that Lenin made these comments at a time when other Bolsheviks such as 
Leon Trotsky were pressing Lenin to impose stricter grain requisitioning policies,22 it can 
be argued that Lenin believed in the necessity of establishing voluntary 
cooperative societies.
Western Thought on Ideological Traditions Within Marxism-Leninism
Their thoughts on cooperatives notwithstanding, though, Marx and Lenin did not 
provide much guidance on how a socialist society should be constructed past the immediate 
consolidation of power by the vanguard party. This void in Marxism-Leninism has been 
the source of much controversy for both Western Sovietologists and Soviet policy-makers. 
One of the main questions that both of these groups of thinkers have had to wrestle with 
since the death of Lenin is, “How does, or should, a ruling Communist party use ideology 
to guide policy?”
For years, many Western analysts subscribed to the view put forward by Carl 
Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, two of the leading advocates of the totalitarian model of 
the Soviet system, which holds that Soviet rulers are compelled by their Communist
12
convictions to base policy on Marxism-Leninism. In the eyes of Friedrich and Brzezinski, 
Marxism-Leninism is an unchanging ideology, which is “focused and projected toward a 
perfect final state of mankind,” and is “based upon a radical rejection of the existing society 
and conquest of the world for a new one.”23
Applied to the USSR, the “perfect final state of mankind” would be communism, 
the “radically rejected existing society” would be czarist Russia, and the “world to be 
conquered” for the “new” socialist order would be the capitalist one. Friedrich and 
Brzezinski further assert that the employment of violence for the realization of ideological 
goals, combined with the rejection of the status quo upon which the ideology is predicated, 
ultimately necessitates that Soviet leaders “force reality to fit theory.”24 From these 
hypotheses, it is clear that Friedrich and Brzezinski believe that Soviet leaders feel obliged 
to base policy on the revolutionary ideology of Marx and Lenin.
However, these totalitarian theorists fail to take a major factor into consideration in 
reaching their conclusions about Soviet ideology: the existence of a gradualist tradition 
within Marxism-Leninism. One author who makes a strong case for the legitimacy of this 
gradualist tradition is Stephen Cohen, an American Sovietologist. In Bukharin and the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Cohen argues that following 1921, Bolshevism was “bifurcated by 
two conflicting ideological traditions”: revolutionary-heroic and evolutionary-gradualist.25
While recognizing that Marxism-Leninsm possessed a daring and violent past 
stemming from the Bolshevik coup of 1917, Cohen also asserts that Lenin bequeathed a 
gradualist legacy to Soviet Communists as a result of his economic writings of 1918 and 
his NEP literature of the early 1920s. Further, Cohen posits that Nikolai Bukharin, one of 
the most influential Bolsheviks following Lenin’s death, best exemplified Lenin’s true
13
wishes.26 In fact, Cohen concludes his book by saying that the NEP advocated by Lenin 
and Bukharin actually represented “the true preconfiguration of the Communist future.”27
One Western political scientist who attempts to account theoretically for the use of 
both ideological traditions within Marxism-Leninism by Communist leaderships is Franz 
Schurmann. In Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Schurmann develops the 
concepts of pure and practical ideology. According to Schurmann, “pure ideology is a set 
of ideas designed to give the individual a unified and conscious world view,” while 
“practical ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational instruments for 
action.”28 Schurmann further asserts that pure and practical ideology are inextricably 
linked. He writes, “Without pure ideology, the ideas of practical ideology have no 
legitimation. But without practical ideology, an organization cannot transform its 
weltanschaung into consistent action.”29
Applying Schurmann’s theory to the Soviet Union, the writings of Marx and Lenin 
that were devoted to analyzing the inevitable demise of capitalism and describing the final 
goal of building communism serve as pure ideology. These writings include both 
revolutionary and gradualist elements. In contrast, practical ideology constitutes those 
policy justifications used by Soviet leaders which represent logical extensions of these 
original theories of Marx and Lenin. Yet, not all policy justifications given by Soviet 
leaders can, or should, be considered practical ideology. Those ones which are not rooted 
in the writings of Marx and Lenin actually represent ideological perversion 
or abandonment.
In fact, it is one of the main contentions of this thesis that Stalin’s collectivization 
campaign was one of the most blatant betrayals of the ideals of Marx and Lenin in Soviet 
history. As will be recalled from the initial review of the writings of Marx and Lenin on
14
cooperation, the two founders of Communist ideology were opposed to complete state 
control of cooperatives and the coercion of peasants into worker collectives. Throughout 
the rest of this essay, the role of pure and practical ideology in the Soviet policy-making 
process will be assessed through the examination of the NEP, the collectivization drive of 
the late 1920s, and the current perestroika program. In the final analysis, it will be shown 
that the attempts by Bukharin and Gorbachev to develop a strong cooperative sector of the 
Soviet economy represented sincere efforts to interpret and implement Marxism-Leninism, 
and that Stalin’s militarily enforced reorganization of the peasantry did not.
15
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEP
The Events Leading to Lenin’s Advocacy of the NEP
Having discussed the concept of ideology and the Soviet use of Marxism- 
Leninism in general and theoretical terms, it is now appropriate to look closely at a 
specific example of how ideology was used to introduce and justify an economic reform 
program: the NEP. By identifying the economic and political factors which motivated 
Lenin to abandon the policy of War Communism and begin building a market socialist 
economy, it will be possible to develop some hypotheses about what sorts of conditions 
lead to the supersession of gradualist ideology over revolutionary ideology. Also, 
analysis of Bukharin’s attempt to continue the economic liberalization program through 
reference to, and elaboration of, Lenin’s works will show how important ideological 
fidelity to Marxism-Leninism has been in procuring political support since the first 
Soviet leader.
One factor that convinced Lenin of the need for the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War was the devastated condition of the Soviet 
Union. Between 1914 and 1921, over twenty million people died in the USSR, including 
twenty-nine percent of the able-bodied male population. Further, as a result of drought 
and poor harvests in 1920 and 1921, millions more died of starvation.1 In comparison to 
the figures of 1913, industrial production and coal production in 1920 decreased by 
eighty-six percent and sixty-seven percent respectively.2 These drastic reductions in
17
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productivity not only reflected the dire state of the Soviet economy, but they also largely 
contributed to the near-complete breakdown of the railway system, the primary means of 
state transportation.
This transportation breakdown contributed to the disaffection of various segments 
of Soviet society from the Bolshevik government, which was another primary reason 
Lenin decided to introduce the NEP. Large numbers of discharged soldiers were left 
stranded far from home and poorly provided for by the government. Some of these 
former defenders of the revolution, who were often armed, resorted to raiding state 
supply centers and stealing from traders to subsist. Further, many of these ex-soldiers 
had been drafted from the ranks of industrial workers, the group which the Bolsheviks 
had hoped would contribute the most to the construction of the new socialist state. Now, 
not only were these one-time industrial workers separated from their means of 
production, but they were becoming increasingly skeptical of the intentions and 
governmental abilities of the Bolsheviks.3
Popular discontent with the Bolsheviks was hardly limited to displaced soldiers, 
however. The wretched urban living conditions had driven many of the industrial 
workers who had not been conscripted to the countryside, and, by the end of 1920, their 
number had dwindled to 1.5 million—less than one-half of those who had toiled in the 
cities in 1917.4 The grain requisitioning policy of the Bolsheviks drew the ever- 
increasing ire of the peasants. Initially, many peasants reacted to this policy by cutting 
back their crop production, but, as the Civil War drew to a close, the peasants in some 
areas formed military units and fought against both the Reds and the Whites. In the 
Tambov region of the Soviet union, one of these peasant militias, which were referred to 
as Greens, actually fought for and gained a fair amount of territory before the Red Army 
was able to suppress the revolt.5
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The group whose defection from the Bolshevik cause most disturbed Lenin and 
influenced him finally to advocate the NEP, though, was that of the Kronstadt sailors. 
These sailors had supported the Bolsheviks wholeheartedly since the October Revolution, 
but, in the closing days of the Civil War, the Kronstadters became disillusioned with “the 
arbitrary rule of the commissars.”6 Inspired by a series of strikes which took place in 
Petrograd during February 1921, the sailors on board the Petropavlovsk drafted a 
resolution calling for, among other things, freedom of speech, new, democratic soviet 
elections in Kronstadt, and expanded ownership rights for peasants.7
Within days, popular support for the Petro-pavlovsJc resolution mushroomed 
tremendously. First, 10,000 people participated in a mass demonstration, and then an ad 
hoc conference of about 300 sailors, soldiers, and workers was formed. This conference 
proceeded to elect a five-man presidium, which soon after ordered the arrest of several 
prominent Bolsheviks in the area. Following these arrests, Lenin sent Leon Trotsky, the 
Commissar for War, and a detachment of Red Army special forces to suppress this 
rebellion. After several days of heavy fighting, Trotsky and his detachment accomplished 
their objective on March 18, 1921.8
Although Lenin said that Kronstadt “lit up reality better than anything else,”9 it 
has been documented that he proposed the NEP to the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party well before the Kronstadt affair.10 When he unveiled the NEP to the 
entire Party at the Tenth Congress, which was held shortly after Trotsky’s victory over 
the Kronstadters, Lenin revealed that the issue of state grain procurement had been 
troubling him for some time. Lenin’s answer to this problem was to introduce a tax in 
kind which would provide the peasantry with financial incentive to trade with the state. 
Lenin also hoped that the tax in kind would serve as the basis for a strong proletariat- 
peasantry alliance, or smychka.u
20
To Lenin, such a smychka was crucial to the preservation of Bolshevik power and 
the development of socialism. In the short term, the smychka was necessary to catalyze 
the Soviet economy. The state needed to procure food to feed the industrial workers in 
order to keep them in, or lure them back to, the city, and to motivate them to produce 
more. To obtain this food, the state had to convince the peasants that it was in their best 
interest to trade their grain with the government. In the long run, Lenin hoped that the 
smychka could be used to win peasant commitment to socialism. According to Lenin, the 
Bolshevik government could gain the political support of the peasants by proving to them 
that the state was a reliable trading partner. Further, Lenin argued that the constant 
contact between the peasants and the state traders would provide the Bolshevik 
government with the opportunity to inculcate socialist values into the peasants.12
Although the Communist party approved Lenin’s resolution at the Tenth 
Congress, it was clear that some opposition to the NEP existed within the Bolshevik 
leadership.13 Initially, Lenin attempted to eliminate this opposition by ramming through 
a ban on Party factionalism at the Tenth Party Congress. However, as time progressed, 
Lenin realized that the best way to win support for the NEP, both within the Party and 
among the non-Bolshevik intelligentsia, was to provide an ideological justification of it. 
(While official explanations of how the NEP would help in the construction of socialism 
inspired some peasants and industrial workers, many others believed that true 
justification of the NEP would come through improved living conditions and economic 
revitalization.) Thus, in May 1921, Lenin wrote and published “The Tax in Kind.”
In this article, Lenin referred to the NEP as a return to the policy of state 
capitalism, which the Bolsheviks had intended to implement in 1918, but which they 
were forced to abandon because of the exigencies of civil war. In fact, Lenin attempted 
to verify this assertion by providing a lengthy excerpt from his 1918 article “The Chief
21
Task of Our Day: ‘Left-Wing’ Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality.” Not
coincidentally, Lenin chose the first paragraph from this excerpt to read:
State capitalism would be a step forward as compared with the present 
state of affairs in our Soviet Republic. If in approximately six months’ 
time state capitalism is established in our Republic, this would be a 
great success and a secure guarantee that within a year socialism will 
have gained a permanently firm hold and will have become invincible 
in this country.14
Throughout the rest of this excerpt, Lenin distinguished between the Bolsheviks and the 
petty bourgoisie, and between state capitalism and private capitalism. According to 
Lenin, the tendency of the petty bourgeoisie to engage in profiteering and capital 
accumulation was inimical to the goal of establishing a state capitalist economy. 
Specifically, he felt that the petty bourgeoisie deliberately would invest its financial 
assets in socially non-productive ventures to undermine the Bolshevik economic 
program; then, the petty bourgeoisie would just wait for the Bolsheviks to relinquish 
power to a more pro-capitalist group. To combat this strategy, Lenin proposed that the 
state take , and maintain, control of the “commanding heights” of the economy, which 
included such things as banking, transportation, and heavy industry. By controlling the 
“commanding heights” of the economy, Lenin thought that the Bolshevik government 
could provide enough public goods and services to maintain the support of the people. 
Also, he theorized that Bolshevik possession of the “commanding heights” would prevent 
the petty bourgoisie from accumulating too much capital and employing it against the 
fledgling socialist government.15
After establishing that building a state capitalist economy was actually the desired 
program of the Bolsheviks before the outbreak of the Civil War, Lenin discussed four 
means through which such a policy could be promoted. These means were pro- 
Bolshevik entrepreneurship, state property leasing, workers’ co-operatives, and joint
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ventures between Western and Soviet economic entities. While Lenin asserted that all of 
these non-state-controlled economic forms needed to be developed to help construct 
state capitalism, he was particularly adamant about creating a strong cooperative sector. 
According to Lenin, cooperarives were an especially desirable component of state 
capitalism because of their capacity to “embrace wider masses of the population” and 
their ability to “pull up the deeper and more tenacious roots of the old pre-socialist and 
even pre-capitalist relations, which most stubbornly resist all ‘innovations.’”16
Several events over the course of the next year and one-half further convinced 
Lenin of the promise of cooperatives. First, the NEP greatly helped improve the entire 
Soviet economy, and Soviet society was able to begin rebuilding itself.17 Second, foreign 
countries and businesses proved to be very reluctant to establish economic ties with the 
USSR. Whether they had political or economic reservations about dealing with a 
socialist state, these potential foreign investors denied Lenin the opportunity to build state 
capitalism with international financial support.18 Finally, the cooperatives which Lenin 
had placed great hopes in back in early 1921 began achieving considerable success.
Large numbers of peasants joined cooperatives, and, soon, these cooperatives began 
seizing increasingly large shares of retail and wholesale trade.19 In fact, Stephen Cohen 
asserted that “by 1922, the cooperatives seemed to be the foremost element of state 
capitalism in Russia.”20
These economic events caused Lenin to rethink long-term socialist strategy. He 
now believed that cooperatives could serve as a link between state capitalism and 
socialism. Lenin also came to recognize the importance of ideologically justifying 
economic programs as a result of the considerable support for the NEP that he was able to 
gain through the publication of “The Tax In Kind.” Consequently, he decided that it was 
imperative to explain the necessity of developing cooperatives in ideological terms.
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Fortunately for Lenin, another Soviet Marxist, A. V. Chayanov, already had devised such 
an argument, and Lenin largely based his case for cooperatives on Chayanov’s works.21
Between 1913 and 1915, Chayanov conducted a study of cooperatives, and he 
published the results in the Budgets o f Peasants in the StarobeVsk District. One of the 
radical conclusions reached by Chayanov was that cooperative farmers based economic 
decision-making on different criteria from that used by capitalist farmers, because the 
former were simultaneously owners of and workers on their property. Specifically, 
Chayanov asserted that while capitalist farmers were primarily concerned with 
maximizing profits, cooperative farmers were motivated chiefly by the need to provide 
for their families. Because this latter goal was based largely on the cooperative 
succeeding, promotion of a social good, albeit limited to the cooperative, was a necessary 
byproduct. Applied on a large scale to a chiefly peasant, agrarian country, as Russia was 
at the time, cooperatives could lead to socialism.22
With Chayanov’s argument in mind, Lenin wrote “On Cooperation,” his most 
impassioned plea for a gradualist approach to socialism. Lenin began this article by 
explaining how he and the Bolshevik leadership had underrated grossly the potential of 
cooperatives in the transition to socialism. Next, he reiterated Chayanov’s primary 
reason for the likelihood of cooperatives leading to the development of socialism—their 
ability to channel private interest towards a collective good. Then, however, Lenin 
introduced a new reason for promoting cooperatives, and this was that the conditions 
existed under which Marx had asserted that cooperatives could lead to socialism. 
Specifically, the proletariat now controlled the political system and could expand 
cooperation on a nationwide scale.23 Thus, having provided Chayanov’s empirical 
evidence and Marx’s theoretical hypothesis in defense of his new position, Lenin boldly 
proclaimed that “the system of civilized cooperators is the system of socialism.”24
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Almost as important to the continued existence of cooperatives during the 
formative years of the Soviet republic as was Lenin’s ideological justification, was 
Lenin’s realistic prognosis of what cooperatives would need to succeed and how long it 
would take for them to become genuinely socialist. In “On Cooperation,” Lenin urged 
the Bolsheviks to give cooperatives “more than ordinary assistance.” Specifically, he 
recommended that cooperatives be given preferential loans, material incentives, and 
official state endorsement.25 Even given this type of support, Lenin recognized that it 
would take “a whole historical epoch to get the entire population into the work of 
cooperatives through NEP,” because the whole nation needed to be culturally educated.26
Taken by itself, “On Cooperation” served as an enthusiastic ideological defense of 
and recommendation for cooperatives. But viewed in conjunction with a series of articles 
that Lenin wrote in the last year of his life, it actually represented one of the major 
components of the first Soviet leader’s political testament. In these articles, which 
included “Pages from a Diary,” “Our Revolution,” “How We Should Re-organize 
Rabkrin,” “Better Fewer, But Better, “ and “Letters to the Congress,” Lenin proposed 
such specific policy actions as the introduction of universal public education, the 
reduction of state bureaucracy, and the reorganization of the Party elite to promote the 
development of the NEP 27
But, more importantly, throughout all of these articles, Lenin stressed the need to
strengthen the smychka between the proletariat and the peasantry, and advocated that this
be done by appealing to the interests of the latter group, and not by coercing them to
become communists immediately. Lenin was particularly adamant about this point in
“Pages from a Diary.” In this article, he wrote:
We must start by establishing contacts between town 
and country without the preconceived aim of implanting 
communism in the rural districts. It is an aim which
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cannot be achieved at the present time. It is 
inopportune, and to set an aim like that at the present 
time would be harmful, instead of useful, to the cause.28
This quote , which was representative of the conciliatory tone of Lenin’s last works, 
indicates rather clearly the first Soviet leader’s desire for the Bolsheviks to pursue a 
gradualist approach to socialism.
Attempts to Execute Lenin’s Testament
Following Lenin’s death, numerous Soviet theorists attempted to bolster 
ideologically the late leader’s case for cooperatives and a gradualist approach to 
socialism. One such theorist was A. V. Chayanov, the pioneering Marxist economist 
whose early work on cooperatives significantly influenced Lenin. Chayanov further 
developed his argument by stressing the advantages that cooperatives could offer to a 
socialist economy in its infancy. Specifically, he argued that cooperatives could develop 
immunity to, and actually help to eradicate, capitalist threats such as worker exploitation 
and hostile buyouts. The members of co-operatives naturally contributed to these goals 
by collectively deciding how to use accrued profits and by pooling their financial 
resources to compete effectively with capitalist landowners. Chayanov also explained 
how a socialist government, with its control of heavy industry, could help cooperatives 
modernize and develop into socialism.29
Another theorist who championed the cooperative cause was L.N. Kritsman, one 
of the leading theorists of the Agrarian-Marxist school of development in the 1920’s. 
Kritsman based his argument on the support Marx and Lenin had expressed for Russian 
cooperatives. Kritsman discerned three facts which led him to believe that cooperatives 
could be used to help build socialism in the Soviet Union. First, cooperatives were an 
indigenous peasant phenomenon in Russia. Second, under Marxist guidance,
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cooperatives could easily be transformed into socialist institutions. Finally, co­
operatives represented the simplest, most painless ways for peasants to grow into 
socialism.30 For these reasons, Kritsman advocated that the Bolsheviks continue to 
promote cooperatives and work to fulfill the prophesies of Marx and Lenin.
Although the contributions of Chayanov and Kritsman were significant to the 
promotion of cooperatives, it was the arguments put forward by Nikolai Bukharin, a 
Politburo member and the editor of Pravda, which most influenced Soviet policy in the 
1920s. Bukharin sought to prove his ideological fidelity to Lenin and create a theory for 
the socialist development of cooperatives which would win the lasting support of the 
Bolsheviks and the Soviet workers. He began this quest by giving a rousing memorial 
speech on Lenin’s contribution to Marxism to the Communist Academy in February of 
1924. In his speech, Bukharin praised Lenin for stressing the importance of the 
proletariat-peasantry smychka, arguing that “Lenin (had) bequeathed an original theory 
of ‘agrarian-cooperative’ socialism.”31 It was this legacy which led Bukharin to 
conclude that NEP Russia must “grow into socialism through an evolutionary period of 
development.”32
Having lent ideological credibility to his case for a gradualist approach to 
socialism, Bukharin attempted to devise a Marxist theoretical justification of 
cooperatives. In “Concerning the New Economic Policy and Our Tasks,” Bukharin 
explained how cooperatives differed in capitalist and socialist societies, a problem which 
had been posed to NEP advocates by Marxist critics inside and outside the USSR. 
Bukharin asserted that in capitalist societies, cooperatives developed ties with capitalist 
institutions such as banks and industrial firms, and inevitably acquired capitalist mind 
sets. Contrarily, in socialist societies, cooperatives built ties with socialist institutions, 
and, therefore, developed socialist perspectives. Thus, Bukharin argued that while all
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cooperatives possessed inherent collectivist tendencies, only in socialist societies would 
these tendencies be developed to their fullest; in capitalist societies, these tendencies 
would be stifled or perverted to the extent that cooperatives would become merely the 
tools of exploitative capitalists.33
Recognizing that it was necessary to appeal to the to the peasants’ economic 
interests to get them to join and work diligently for the cooperatives, Bukharin advocated 
that the socialist government establish an exchange system between socialist institutions 
and cooperatives which provided the latter with maximum benefits. According to 
Bukharin, the state bank needed to provide the cooperatives with preferential credit so 
that they could purchase machinery from the state industrial sector.34 This policy would 
not only benefit the entire economy by providing state industry with a large outlet for its 
goods and allowing the cooperatives to become more efficient through better technology, 
but it also would foster strong ties between state financial institutions and the 
cooperatives. In fact, Bukharin theorized that these ties would result in peasant growth 
“into the economic organization of the proletarian dictatorship” and gradual incorporation 
“into the system of socialist relations.”35
Bukharin’s argument initially won Bolshevik support for cooperatives, and for 
himself as co-leader with Josef Stalin. This was evidenced by the fact that even 
Bolsheviks such as Leon Trotsky and Yevgeny Preobrazhensky who argued that the 
Soviet Union needed to industrialize more rapidly than Bukharin advocated, agreed with 
the Soviet co-leader that a gradualist approach to socialism needed to be pursued.36 
Also, in 1925, Stalin himself said, “We (the Bolsheviks) stand, and we shall stand, for 
Bukharin.”37 Further, Bukharin’s writings provided the reassurance about the state’s 
commitment to the NEP necessary to convince many peasants to join or form 
cooperatives. By 1927, the number of operating cooperatives had increased by over 100
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percent since 1921, and nearly one-third of all peasant households belonged to a 
cooperative.38 Also, in comparison to the figures for the 1922-1923 period, the amount 
of retail trade garnered by cooperatives in the 1926-1927 period was 19 times greater, 
and it marked the first time in Soviet history that cooperatives garnered a larger share of 
retail trade than did the state or private traders.39
The NEP in Perspective
At this time, it is useful to identify several facts about the Soviet use of ideology 
which the preceding examination of the NEP has revealed. First, victory in the Civil 
War, existence of a worsening economic crisis, and increasing popular malaise made 
advocacy of a gradualist ideology a desirable and necessary choice for the Bolshevik 
Party. Second, the Bolshevik leadership developed this gradualist component of 
Marxism-Leninism as a way of facilitating the construction of socialism in Russia, which 
was comprised largely of peasants and not industrial workers. Third, ideology served as a 
source of motivation for both Lenin and Bukharin, and it was used to justify policies and 
activate the masses. Finally, two specific techniques were used to attribute legitimacy to 
particular aspects of ideological development. One method was to make reference to 
Marx, as Lenin did, or to Lenin, as subsequent theorists did. The other way that Soviet 
leaders and scholars attempted to prove ideological fidelity to Marxism-Leninism was to 
show how a particular policy contributed to the eventual creation of a socialist society.
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CHAPTER m  
Collectivization and Its Consequences
A Change in Soviet Priorities
As demonstrated by the fact that in 1926 grain harvests and industrial production 
had returned approximately to their pre-war levels, the NEP had improved Soviet 
economic performance.1 However, several events in 1927 caused Bukharin and Stalin to 
modify the methods and the goals of the NEP. First, the thwarting of a Communist 
uprising in China and a subsequent reactionary backlash in Western Europe worried the 
Soviet leadership that hostile capitalist powers might try to crush the world’s first 
socialist government. This threat of war convinced Bukharin and Stalin that a more rapid 
industrialization drive was needed to provide the state with sufficient means to defend the 
USSR.
To inspire the Soviet people to support and contribute to the industrialization 
drive, the leadership spoke in dark and urgent terms about the need to “catch up and
surpass” the capitalist countries industrially. These alarmist speeches had the un-
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intended effect of unleashing widespread hoarding during the summer and early fall of 
1927. Making matters worse, many peasants chose not to sell their produce to the state 
during the fall because they could obtain better prices from Nepmen, or private traders, 
and because of the dearth of cheap goods available to purchase from the state.2 
Consequently, as a result of hoarding and poor state produce procurement, a grain crisis 
developed.
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At the end of 1927, Bukharin and Stalin devised a plan which they believed would 
provide the state with the means to achieve both rapid industrialization and increased 
grain acquisition. This two-pronged plan called for greater state investment in heavy and 
light industry and the allocation of industrial resources from central authorities. By 
investing more in light industry, and by raising grain prices, the state hoped to improve its 
trading relationship with the peasantry. In addition to facilitating the creation of 
affordable goods that the peasantry demanded, the Soviet co-leaders thought that their 
new industrial policy would contribute to the development of heavy industry, which they 
felt was critical to the defense capability of the USSR. Further, they believed that state 
participation in the industrial appropriation process would promote full resource 
utilization and means of obtaining desired growth rates.3
While limited central planning certainly was a primary feature of this new 
industrial policy, Bukharin made it clear that he did not want a return to War 
Communism. He did so by demanding that three criteria be met in the establishment and 
implementation of an industrial plan. First, target figures were to be devised according to 
scientific calculation and not the arbitrary will of political leaders or planners. Second, 
proportionality between light and heavy industry would be one of the most important 
considerations in the minds of the plan’s decision-makers. Finally, the planning targets, 
once reached, would serve as flexible guidelines and not mandatory decrees.4
At the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU, which was held in December 1927, 
Bukharin’s requests were honored; general directives—not mandatory quotas—were 
presented and ratified. Also at the Fifteenth Party Congress, however, the seeds for 
forced collectivization were planted in the form of an adopted resolution calling for the 
unification and transformation of small peasant farms into large collectives to be one of 
the Party’s main tasks during the next five years. When speaking on this resolution at the
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congress, Bukharin issued warnings against overzealous implementation of this new 
Party policy.5 On this subject, he was emphatic that collectivization should not be 
accomplished through “hysterical maneuvering” or from “shots from a revolver.”6
According to Bukharin, individual peasant house-holds could be convinced to 
join larger, more efficient production cooperatives through financial incentives.
Believing that the successful policy the Bolsheviks had used to encourage peasants to join 
marketing cooperatives could be applied equally as well to production cooperatives, he 
advocated that the state provide production cooperatives with preferential access to state 
loans and state technology. Further, he proposed that direct monetary inducements be 
given to individuals who joined or formed production cooperatives. While Bukharin 
supported the gradual development of production cooperatives, he wholly opposed the 
idea that this could be achieved at the expense of individual middle peasants or marketing 
cooperatives. In fact, he argued that these three types of economic entities should coexist 
for “several decades.”7
However, Bukharin had come to think much less favorably about one particular 
form of private producers: the kulaks. Their decision to sell their relatively large amounts 
of grain to Nepmen instead of the state in the fall of 1927 had shaken Bukharin’s belief 
that they could “grow into socialism.” Thus, whereas he had told all peasants to “enrich 
yourselves” in 1925, Bukharin now asserted that a “forced offensive against the kulak” 
should be initiated to “limit his exploitive tendencies.”8 But Bukharin urged that this 
offensive should be a peaceful one designed only to deprive the kulaks of their primary 
means of profiteering. Specifically, he recommended that kulaks be subjected to heavier 
taxation, stricter laws on hiring and land leasing procedures, and reduced voting 
privileges in land societies to which they belonged.9
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Stalin’s Manipulation of the Grain Crisis
Although it is apparent from the previous discussion that Bukharin favored non- 
coercive behavior modification of the kulaks, events in early 1928 compelled him to 
retreat from this position. During the first weeks in January, the grain crisis became 
acute. The state possessed only 52 percent of the grain that it had at the same time in 
1927, and shortages were becoming severe throughout the Soviet Union.10 In order to 
feed the hungry Soviet people, the Politburo unanimously voted to enact “extraordinary” 
measures. Under these “extraordinary” measures, Soviet authorities were allowed to fine 
and prosecute speculators and to confiscate their hoarded grain.11
When Bukharin and his primary Politburo allies, Aleksei Rykov and Mikhail 
Tomsky, agreed to support this emergency policy urged by Stalin, they believed that it 
would be applied only temporarily, and that it would be aimed at kulaks almost 
exclusively.12 However, Stalin, to whom responsibility for execution of this policy was 
given, interpreted the “extraordinary” measures in a totally different way. Viewing the 
unanimous Politburo vote as a mandate to begin carrying out the collectivization drive 
prescribed at the Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin commanded local Party officials to 
seize grain by all necessary means. To ensure that these orders were being followed, he 
personally traveled to Siberia to oversee the administration of the “extraordinary” 
measures.
In Siberia, Stalin initiated a comprehensive collectivization campaign, which 
would later serve as the model for nationwide collectivization. After listening to local 
Party officials assert that the main problem they faced in obtaining grain from peasants 
was the low state purchasing prices, Stalin removed them from their posts. He then 
formed armed requisitioning squads, who proceeded to seize grain and arrest peasants 
arbitrarily. Stalin also closed private farmer’s markets and began forcing peasants into
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communes. Soon this institutionalized terror began to yield results, and Stalin departed 
Siberia. Before leaving, however, Stalin warned the purged and demoralized Siberian 
Party organization that it had better continue to collect large quantities of grain or risk 
further reorganization by Moscow.13
Upon returning to Moscow, Stalin was confronted by an outraged Politburo 
headed by Bukharin. While re-affirming their support for the resolution on “extra­
ordinary” measures, they chastised Stalin for harassing innocent middle peasants as well 
as kulaks, for using an unnecessary amount of force, and for upsetting local market 
relations. Further, Bukharin and his allies became much more closely involved in 
implementation of the policy. Directives sent to local Party officials included strong 
condemnations of “excesses” and resolute denials that the “extraordinary” measures were 
intended to renew War Communism and end the NEP.14 Also, A.I. Mikoyan, Stalin’s 
right-hand man in the grain procurement drive, was asked by the Politburo to write an 
article for Pravda explaining the adverse effect which the agricultural campaign in 
Siberia had on peasant-proletariat relations. In this article, Mikoyan asserted that many 
of the activities of the armed requisitioning squads were “harmful, unlawful, and 
inadmissible.”15
These official pronouncements, combined with mild application of the 
“extraordinary” measures and increased state grain purchasing prices, helped the 
Bolsheviks reestablish decent relations with the middle peasants. The state continued to 
obtain sufficient levels of grain, and, at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 
Stalin declared that “the crisis had been averted.”16 Following this proclamation, the 
“extraordinary” measures were suspended. However, just a few short weeks later, a 
series of natural and man-made problems forced the Party to reactivate the measures to 
avert agricultural disaster and widespread famine.
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First, an unusually severe winter resulted in the destruction of much wheat in the 
Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Due to this fact, these regions required the state to 
provide them with grain supplies and resources to resow their land. Ordinarily, the 
amount of wheat that the state had acquired during the winter and early spring of 1928 
would have allowed it to deliver the necessary quantity to the two hard-hit regions. But, 
because Stalin’s centralized implementation of the “extraordinary” measures deprived 
many farm regions of the grain ordinarily sold to them by local peasants, the state was 
forced to distribute grain to many places which previously had been self-sufficient. Also, 
the local Party organizations across the Soviet Union had relaxed their grain procurement 
drives following the suspension of the “extraordinary” measures, and the resulting drop, 
modest though it was, contributed to the worsening of the situation.17
This unexpected grain shortage further eroded Stalin’s confidence in the reliability 
of individual peasant farmers. He even went so far as to say that the Soviet Union could 
“no longer make progress on the basis of the small individual peasant economy.”18 In a 
speech which he gave at the Moscow Institute of Red Professors in late May, Stalin 
asserted that the country could move towards socialism only by making the “transition 
from individual peasant farming to collective, common farming.”19 In Bukharin’s view, 
these words indicated that Stalin was contemplating renewing and accelerating the 
collectivization campaign that he had begun in Siberia in January.
To prevent Stalin from taking this course of action, Bukharin attempted to alert 
the other members of the Politburo to the dangers which Stalin’s actions and public 
statements represented. In a series of letters to these members, Bukharin argued that 
Stalin had increased the severity of the “extraordinary” measures since their reactivation, 
and that, as a consequence, the peasant-proletariat smychka was threatened. Bukharin 
also claimed that Stalin’s talk of a “class war” against kulaks and a “sudden leap toward
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collectivization” in speeches and journal articles called into question whether the General 
Secretary was preparing to initiate a second socialist revolution which would bring the 
NEP to a close. Denouncing both of these developments as abandonments of Marxism- 
Leninism, Bukharin requested that these issues be discussed at the upcoming CPSU 
Central Committee Plenum in July.20
The Political Battle Between Bukharin and Stalin
In response to these letters, Stalin mobilized his supporters in the Central 
Committee, and the July Plenum became the battleground for a decisive showdown 
between Bukharin and the General Secretary. Asserting that the price-raising proposal 
on grain put forward by two Bukharinist supporters represented a capitulation to the 
kulaks, Stalin claimed that such concessions were the ideas of “peasant philosophers” and 
not “Marxists or Leninists.”21 The following day, Bukharin addressed the comments 
made by Stalin and argued that Lenin himself had made market relations between the 
peasants and the state the basis of the smychka during the NEP, and he reaffirmed 
Lenin’s belief that the Party “must in no case allow a threat to the smychka.”22
Bukharin’s speech convinced the Central Committee of the necessity of 
maintaining good relations with the peasantry, and, consequently, they voted to raise 
grain prices, to terminate the “extraordinary measures,” and to pronounce publicly the 
Party’s support for the continuation of the NEP. However, as the Plenum was drawing to 
a close, rumors circulated that Stalin had yielded in his demands for an accelerated 
collectivization campaign only because he did not have quite the strength within the 
Central Committee at the time to discredit Bukharin and his allies completely.23
One month after the Plenum, though, Stalin launched a political assault on 
Bukharin’s allies. The General Secretary began this offensive by having the pro- 
smychka editors of Pravda and the Bolshevik removed from their posts. Next, Stalin
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attacked the Party leadership of Moscow, which had expressed strong opposition to 
forced collectivization proposals.24 In an address to a special meeting of the Moscow 
Central Committee, Stalin demanded that a “relentless fight against the Right, opportunist 
danger in our Party” be waged because “the triumph of the right deviation in our Party 
would unleash the forces of capitalism (and) undermine the revolutionary positions of the 
proletariat.”25 Less than a month after this speech, Moscow district secretaries recently 
appointed by Stalin pressured Nikolai Uglanov, the city’s Party boss, to recant for Right 
deviations.
Following his shake-up of the Moscow Party organization, Stalin sought to wrest 
control of the Trade Unions from Mikhail Tomsky, one of Bukharin’s strongest 
supporters on the Politburo. Using his powers as General Secretary, Stalin appointed 
many of his allies to the Party caucus for the Eighth Trade Union Congress. These 
delegates succeeded in placing a resolution urging complete union support for a heavy 
industrialization drive in the Congress platform against the wishes of Tomsky, who 
claimed that the proposal could “victimize the working class and transform unions into 
houses of detention.”26 Once the Congress actually approved the resolution and voted 
five Stalinists onto the Central Trade Union Council, Tomsky submitted his resignation 
as chairman of this body.27
The Revelation of the Ideological Split
Tomsky’s resignation was the act that most convinced Bukharin that action had to 
be taken to prevent Stalin from completely removing gradualists from the policy-making 
process and abandoning the NEP. Choosing the fifth anniversary of Lenin’s death to 
make his dire appeal to CPSU Central Committee members, Bukharin composed an 
article entitled “Lenin’s Political Testament.” In this article, Bukharin stated Lenin’s case 
for the NEP. Specifically, Bukharin recounted how Lenin repeatedly had asserted that
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the construction of Soviet socialism was dependent on good relations between the 
proletariat and the peasantry and on the development of capital accumulation and 
industrialization proceeding “on the healthy base of expanding market relations.”28
Following the publication of this article, many of Stalin’s supporters publicly 
condemned Bukharin for portraying Lenin as “a common peasant philosopher.”29 
Around the same time that the controversy over this article was rising, Stalin happened to 
learn about Bukharin’s secret meeting with Kamenev in July 1922. With this discovery, 
Stalin sought to discredit Bukharin further. He convened a special joint meeting of the 
Politburo and the leaders of the Central Control Commission to discuss Bukharin’s 
alleged “factional activity.” At this meeting, Stalin accused Bukharin of masterminding a 
“right-opportunist, capitulatory platform” and conspiring to form “an anti-Party bloc 
with the Trotskyists.”30
Prepared for just these sorts of charges, Bukharin responded by presenting a 
thirty-page counter-indictment of Stalin. In this lengthy report, Bukharin asserted that 
Stalin had attempted to “implant bureaucratism and establish a personal regime inside the 
Party.” According to Bukharin, Stalin’s power politics made it impossible for problems 
to be debated earnestly and resolved rationally, and it was because of these “abnormal 
conditions” that Bukharin met with Kamenev to gain the latter’s cooperation in exposing 
Stalin as an aspiring dictator.31
Bukharin’s spirited and organized self-defense took the Politburo members and 
Central Control Commission leaders by surprise. The group established a small 
commission to investigate both sets of charges. This commission, which was comprised 
largely of Stalinists, decided that if Bukharin retracted his indictment against Stalin and 
acknowledged that he had committed a “political error” in meeting with Kamemev, he 
need not be censured. However, Bukharin rejected this solution because he realized that
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his “confession” would be used by Stalin either to force him to accept the super­
industrialization program or to expel him entirely from the political process. Bukharin’s 
decision infuriated the entire body of jurors involved in the case, and, on February 9, they 
strongly censured him for his “factional activity.”32
With this major victory in hand, Stalin lobbied for the adoption of a five-year 
plan emphasizing collectivization and rapid industrialization at the Central Committee 
Plenum in April. In a speech to the Central Committee, Stalin asserted, “We (the Party) 
must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture 
will be supplied with the means for its reconstruction.”33 Additionally, Stalin asserted 
that “whipping up the tempo of the development of agriculture” was dependent on 
“amalgamating scattered peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms.”34
In his speech, Stalin challenged Bukharin both as a political leader and as a 
Marxist theoretician. Stalin criticized Bukharin for his proposal that Soviet agriculture be 
bolstered through “market normalization” and the “development of individual peasant 
farming.” According to Stalin, the result of such a strategy would be “to reduce the rate 
of development of industry and to undermine the new forms of the bond (between the 
peasantry and the proletariat).”35 Labeling Bukharin a Right deviationist, Stalin 
criticized him for asserting that kulaks could grow into socialism. In Stalin’s opinion, 
such a hypothesis contradicted the Marxist theory of class struggle. The Central 
Committee members subsequently voted to remove Bukharin as chief editor of Pravda 
and General Secretary of the Comintern and by approving Stalin’s five-year plan.36
The Implications and Effects of Bukharin’s Ouster
By effectively denying Bukharin any forum to voice opposition to forced 
collectivization and placing his thought outside of the Marxist tradition, Stalin obtained 
the power to redefine Soviet ideology concerning agriculture. Whereas prior to the
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silencing of Bukharin, the NEP had been perceived as means of building socialism, Stalin 
now claimed that it “was not only a retreat (from socialism), but also the preparation for a 
new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.”37
Stalin’s revision of Lenin’s agricultural directives included a greatly increased 
differentiation between types of cooperatives. Stalin evaluated cooperatives in terms of 
the privatization which existed within them. Judging according to this criteria, he 
condemned the prostye and TOZ forms of cooperatives, which were the types that Lenin 
had expressed much hope about in his last writings, because they allowed private 
ownership of livestock, dwellings, light equipment, and even some land.38
Stalin expressed more optimism in the artel form of cooperative because it began 
the process of the socialization of the means of production. However, the fact that 
members of the artel were paid according to their work done disturbed Stalin’s sense of 
egalitarianism. Because the kommuna form of cooperative provided for equal salaries, 
collective organization of the farm, and collective ownership of property, it received 
Stalin’s highest blessing.39 In fact, once Stalin initiated his second collectivization 
campaign in late 1930, the kommuna became the model for the kolkhoz, or collective 
farm. By the end of 1936, almost 90 percent of the peasant households had been 
incorporated into these types of collective farms.40
However, this massive collectivization was achieved only at great economic and 
political cost. Following the herding of millions of peasants onto collective farms in 
1931 and 1932, mass confusion and hysteria arose among these coerced farmers. Owing 
to the rough treatment, low pay, and lack of state guidance concerning proper division of 
labor that they received from the state, peasants on many collective farms began 
slaughtering much of the livestock for their own personal consumption. To stop this 
phenomenon, Stalin had severe legislation adopted which made pilfering of kolkhoz
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property punishable by “the maximum means of social defense, shooting, or in case of 
extenuating circumstances, deprivation of freedom for not less than ten years, with 
confiscation of all property.”41
Stalin’s strict policy did not contribute to the improvement of the agricultural 
situation. In fact, the harsh law only further demoralized the peasants as evidenced by the 
fact that they left 13 percent of the summer crop unharvested.42 Infuriated by this 
performance, Stalin decreed that regions which failed to meet their 1932 grain quotas 
would cease to be provided with state commodities. When it became apparent that this 
threat still would not result in the fulfillment of the grain quota, Stalin ordered that the 
law against kolkhoz pilfering be enforced to a greater extent and that state authorities 
seize the necessary amounts of grain to meet the 1932 planned figure. These combined 
actions allowed the state to obtain a minimally acceptable quantity of grain, but resulted 
in the deaths of millions of peasants.43
The severity and costliness of these grain requisitioning tactics caused numerous 
Bolsheviks, including several long-time Politburo allies of Stalin, to question the 
correctness of collectivization.44 Stalin seized upon the mysterious assassination of one 
of these individuals, Sergei Kirov, a Politburo member and Leningrad Party chief, to 
strike a death blow to all those people who represented a threat his power as General 
Secretary and to his plans for the continued rapid construction of socialism. Portraying 
Kirov’s murder as the first act in a Trotskyite conspiracy to eliminate the Stalinist 
leadership, Stalin began to try his former political opponents for treason.
In the first such trial, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and fourteen other members of the 
defeated Left opposition were forced to confess to conspiracy and to implicate the leaders 
of the scorned Right deviation group. Their accusations led to the trial of Bukharin, 
Rykov, and nineteen other Right deviationists. All twenty-one defendants in this second
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trial were found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.45 With Bukharin’s 
execution, Stalin had silenced permanently the last of his former opponents and served 
notice to all that the slightest deviation from the Stalinist line was a capital offense.
A Retrospective Evaluation of Stalinism
From the preceding account of the development of Stalin’s collectivization 
program, it is evident that Bukharin did not support the institutionalization of state grain 
requistioning and the establishment of inflexible grain quotas that Stalin eventually 
implemented. Further, it should be noted that Bukharin expressed his complete 
opposition to the idea of coercing peasants to join collective farms. Most importantly, 
though, it is necessary to recognize how and why Bukharin disputed these Stalinist 
policies. Specifically, he objected to the creation of a socialism in which voluntary 
cooperatives had no place. Consequently, he defended his cause by reiterating Lenin’s 
repeated calls for the promotion of co-operatives and spoke of the dangers that 
collectivization could have on Soviet agriculture. Although his warnings proved to be 
prophetic, they also contributed to his demise.
Stalin chose to overcome Bukharin’s opposition to collectivization by politically 
isolating him and portraying him as non-Marxist theorist and an anti-Leninist 
conspirator. After successfully removing Bukharin from the policy-making process and 
discrediting his gradualist program, Stalin introduced his alternative strategy for building 
socialism in the USSR. Specifically, he called for rapid industrialization and forced 
collectivization. In advocating such policies, Stalin implicitly rejected Lenin’s 
recommendation for long-term implementation of the NEP and Marx’s warning against 
coercing peasants to join worker collectives. For this reason, Stalin’s industrialization 
and collectivization campaigns should be regarded as major deviations from Marxism- 
Leninism.
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CHAPTER IV
PERESTROIKA: A RETURN TO MARKET SOCIALISM
Economic Stagnation Under Brezhnev
During the latter part of the Brezhnev regime, the adverse effects of Stalin’s super­
industrialization and forced collectivization policies became increasingly apparent. After 
decades of maintaining high economic growth rates, the USSR experienced a precipitous 
decline in this statistic in the late 1970s. In contrast to the 7.7 percent Net Material Product 
growth rate achieved by the Soviet government for the 1966-1970 period, the figure for 
the 1976-1980 period was only 4.2 percent. Comparing the growth rates for gross 
industrial output and gross agricultural output for the same two time periods reveals a 
similar trend: the former dropped from 8.5 percent to 4.4 percent and the latter decreased 
from 3.9 percent to 1.7 percent.1
The primary cause of this deterioration in growth rates was the declining 
productivity of resources, and the main reason for the latter phenomenon was the lack of 
incentive offered by the command-administrative system built by Stalin. Enterprises were 
discouraged from devising more effective ways of producing goods by the multiple levels 
of authority which had to approve proposed innovations and determine how to incorporate 
them into the plans of the enterprise. On the other hand, individuals were deterred from 
working as industriously as possible with the means actually at their disposal by the fact 
that there would be few worthwhile consumer goods on which to spend their bonus 
because of the government’s continued emphasis on heavy industry and military spending. 
Further, workers recognized that increased enterprise productivity would result in the
raising of target figures for the enterprise in the next plan.2
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The problems which the lack of incentives and autonomy caused in the field of 
Soviet agriculture were especially troublesome to the Brezhnev regime. Because the state 
paid farm workers a predetermined low wage that was based on greatly subsidized 
consumer food prices, farmers were not motivated to give 100 percent effort to harvesting. 
Inflexible plan dictates also discouraged farmers from working efficiently because the state 
told them what, when, where, and how to produce agricultural goods. Because 
unpredictable weather and mechanical failures with farm equipment were not factored into 
the plan, considerable waste and target shortfalls resulted.3
Consequently, the government decided to invest heavily in the agricultural sector. 
For the 1971-1975 period, the state increased agriculture’s share of the total budget to 26.2 
percent, and, for the 1976-1980 period, agriculture was allotted 33 percent of the entire 
budget.4 However, most of this investment was directed toward upgrading equipment and 
not improving farmers’ salaries. As a result, farmers chose not to work as diligently as 
possible, and the agricultural situation did not really improve. This was evidenced by the 
fact that, despite the large investment in agriculture, the Soviet government had to allocate 
40 percent of its hard-currency import spending on food goods.5
Gorbachev’s Contributions as Agricultural Secretary
In 1978, Brezhnev promoted a relatively young Party First Secretary from the 
Stavropol region to the position of CPSU Central Committee Secretary, and put him in 
charge of agriculture. This new secretary’s name was Mikhail Gorbachev, and he soon 
presented the Central Committee with a proposal for reinvigorating the agricultural sector. 
Specifically, he recommended that collective farms be allowed to allot plots of land to 
groups of farm families. By giving them the necessary equipment, material, and freedom 
to raise livestock or crops, and offering them bonuses for whatever they produced above 
their contractual quota to the collective, Gorbachev hoped to re-instill a sense of autonomy 
and industriousness in these farm families.6 Believing that this idea carried some merit, the
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Central Committee adopted a decree empowering the managers of collective farms to 
distribute land to farm families.7
Although it took some time before this decree was implemented on a wide scale by 
farm managers, by 1981 the contribution of farm families to state food production 
increased significantly. For that year, the output yielded by farm families constituted 25 
percent of Soviet food production and represented the largest amount contributed by semi- 
autonomous entities in the post-Stalin era.8 Unfortunately for Gorbachev, part of the 
reason that these zvenos (“normless links”) accounted for such a relatively large portion of 
total food production was that actual agricultural output was considerably below the target 
figure for 1981.9
This shortfall convinced Gorbachev that a critical analysis of Soviet agriculture 
needed to be conducted. Consequently, he convened a conference of agricultural 
specialists in April of 1982. The boldest critiques of Soviet agriculture presented at this 
conference were given by Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Vladimir Tikhonov, two theorists who 
would play a major role in the development of perestroika. Zaslavskaya contended that 
farmers were becoming alienated from their work because the relations of production had 
not really been altered since Stalin’s time, and Tikhonov argued that the state’s over­
administration of the agricultural sector had stifled the creative instinct of Soviet peasants. 
Not surprisingly, both Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov recommended that farmers be given 
more freedom to decide what to produce and what methods to use to achieve the desired 
results as a means of improving the Soviet agricultural system.10
Apparently the analyses provided by Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov impressed 
Gorbachev because the 1982 CPSU “Food Program,” for which he had ultimate 
responsibility, called for the for the expansion of the farm family contract arrangement. 
Specifically, it allowed individual groups of farm families (zvenos) to merge with other 
such groups on the collective farm to form to form a larger entity (brigada).n  While the
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brigada, which could have up to thirty members, was similar to the zveno in that each unit 
leased land and equipment from the farm management and was responsible for providing 
the collective with an agreed upon quota, the two semi-autonomous units differed in terms 
of organization and payment. Whereas the zveno operated according to precepts of 
collective decision-making and responsibility, with all members being paid equally, the 
brigadi had a selected leader who supervised the operation and paid members according to 
the quality and quantity of work that each one contributed.12
By legalizing the brigadi, Gorbachev hoped to re-stimulate peasant initiative and to 
enable individual groups of farm families to produce more efficiently by coordinating 
planting and harvesting plans with other such groups on a collective farm. To 
Gorbachev’s satisfaction, the brigadi did yield favorable results. In 1983, the brigadi 
helped increase Soviet agri-cultural output by 5.1 percent.13 Further, the percentage of 
total food production contributed by teams on collective contract (i.e., zvenos and brigadi) 
grew in each of the years that Gorbachev continued to preside over agriculture.14 These 
accomplishments of the zvenos and brigadi led Gorbachev to assert early in his leadership 
as General Secretary that “the collective contract and economic accountability are the most 
important factors for increasing the efficiency of (agricultural) production.”15
Gorbachev’s Call for Ideological Renewal
Having benefited from the advice given to him by Zaslavskaya and Tikhonov in 
1982, Gorbachev appointed both of them to a special group created to restudy the NEP 
when he was elected General Secretary of the CPSU in March of 1985. Headed by Abel 
Aganbegyan, a leading Soviet economist, this study group devoted nearly one year to 
identifying elements of the NEP which could be adapted to the present-day Soviet 
Union.16 Receiving the group’s recommendations just prior to Twenty-Seventh CPSU 
Congress in February of 1986, Gorbachev decided to propose to the Congress that a
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modified tax in kind be made a primary basis for continuing the improvement of 
agricultural productivity.
In his opening speech to the Party Congress, Gorbachev said:
The main idea is to give broad scope to economic methods of 
management, to substantially broaden the autonomy of collective 
and state farms, to increase their interest in and responsibility for 
the end results. In substance, it is a question of creatively 
applying, in the conditions of today, Lenin’s idea of the 
food tax.17
Elaborating on this idea, Gorbachev stated that farms would be allowed to use all produce 
harvested above the planned target as it saw fit. Although he hoped that the state would be 
able to procure this additional produce through heightened pay for it and other incentives, 
he explicitly stated that farms could sell it on the collective farm market or through 
cooperative trade outlets.18
Had Gorbachev alluded to Lenin’s NEP only this one time in the speech to the 
Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, it probably would have been enough to cause quite a stir 
among Soviet social scientists and Western observers alike. However, Gorbachev aroused 
everyone’s curiosity about the direction in which he hoped to lead the USSR by making 
reference to two other significant components of Lenin’s gradualist plan: creative 
development of ideology and state support for voluntary cooperatives. In a section of his 
speech dedicated to evaluating the relationship between ideology and reality, Gorbachev 
asserted that “fidelity to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine lies in creatively developing it on the 
basis of the experience that has been accumulated.”19 Further, Gorbachev posited that it 
was imperative for socialist ideology “to draw its energy and effectiveness from the 
interaction of advanced ideas with the practice of building a new society.”20
In the same speech to the Party Congress, Gorbachev stated that creating actual 
conditions in which the worker regained a sense of ownership for his labor was critical to
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the task of renewing Soviet ideology.21 According to Gorbachev, one way of providing
the worker with such a feeling of ownership was to encourage self-reliant and self-
governing cooperatives. For this reason, Gorbachev proclaimed:
And wherever the need exists, utmost support should be given to 
the establishment and growth of cooperative enterprises and 
organizations. They should become widespread in the 
manufacture and processing of products, in housing construction 
and in construction on garden and vegetable allotments, and in 
the spheres of services and trade.22
Gorbachev’s call for an updated tax in kind, a re-evaluation of official ideology, 
and the promotion of independent cooperatives inspired numerous Soviet analysts to re­
examine Lenin’s later works and the NEP experience. One such person was Fyodor 
Burlatsky, a renowned Soviet journalist. In an article for Literaturnaya Gazeta, Burlatsky 
proposed some modifications of ideas espoused by Lenin to contribute to the gradual 
development of socialism. First, like Gorbachev, he called for an updated tax in kind, 
which would be predicated on the provision of greater economic independence to collective 
farms and state farms and the creation of a more equivalent system of exchange between 
the farms and the state. Second, he advocated that cooperatives be created in all economic 
sectors which, from the outset, could practice internal self-government and economic self­
accountability.23 Finally, Burlatsky recommended that the CPSU put Lenin’s theory of 
self-critical evaluation of policy into practice by “resolutely rejecting methods that have not 
worked, and developing a clear concept of constructive transformations.”24
Establishing a Leninist Program for Change
Conducting just such a sort of self-critical evaluation of its policies, the Gorbachev 
government decided that it was necessary to present legislation on individual labor activity 
to the Supreme Soviet. In lobbying for approval of the bill, the government identified three 
primary benefits that individual labor activity would have for the Soviet economy. 
According to the government, the new legislation could “bring the ‘desirable’ part of the
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shadow economy under state control and taxation.”25 Additionally, the new law would be 
helpful in tapping “unused labor reserves,” because the people who would be eligible to 
perform individual labor activity—housewives, students, and pensioners—accounted for 
an estimated 20 percent of the population. Finally, the government claimed that the new 
workers which the law would create could provide badly needed consumer goods and 
services.26
On November 19, 1986, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed the Law on Individual 
Labor Activity. Although the law did not become operative until May 1, 1987, there were 
approximately 8,000 individual enterprises employing over 80,000 people registered with 
the state by October of the same year.27 Perhaps more impressively, though, these 
enterprises provided the public with an estimated 134 million rubles worth of goods and 
services.28 In light of this success, Gorbachev determined that it would be economically 
beneficial to expand the entrepreneurial opportunities for all Soviet workers. In contrast to 
the Law on Individual Labor Activity, which only allowed family members residing 
together to form new enterprises, Gorbachev envisaged a law which would permit 
unrelated individuals to establish large-sized cooperatives.29 As a means of building 
support for such a law, Gorbachev, in two major speeches, recounted Lenin’s 
recommendations for the promotion of cooperatives by the state.
In his first speech, which was given to a special joint session of the CPSU Central 
Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of 
the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachev praised Lenin for recognizing that cooperatives were 
“(one) of the very ways and means of moving towards socialism.”30 Gorbachev further 
asserted that Stalin’s policy of collectivization represented “a deviation from Leninist policy 
with respect to the peasantry.”31 Finally, after stating that the government was seriously 
taking into account the lessons of the NEP and collectivization in building perestroika,
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Gorbachev proclaimed that radical economic reform would require “a drastic expansion of 
the independence of associations and enterprises.”32
Gorbachev revealed one way in which he hoped to contribute to such a “drastic 
expansion” in a speech given to the Fourth All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers in 
March 1988: through a new law on cooperatives. In his opening remarks to this congress, 
Gorbachev paraphrased Lenin’s quotation that “the growth of cooperatives is the same as 
the growth of socialism” and reiterated his belief that “blatant distortions of Leninist 
teachings were perpetrated when collectivization was carried out in the late 1920s and early 
1930s.”33 Then, after recounting how much cooperatives had helped the Soviet economy 
during the NEP, Gorbachev proclaimed that “the cooperative movement and all its diversity
a
must be revived.”34
To spark this revival, Gorbachev told the congress that the Politburo had approved 
a draft law on cooperatives and was submitting it for public discussion. This proposed 
legislation included provisions allowing universal right to participation, expanded sphere of 
operation, and increased auxiliary privileges for cooperatives. The draft law also contained 
amendments requiring the state to contribute to the development of cooperatives by 
providing credit to them, not hampering them with a lengthy licensing process, and not 
burdening them with heavy taxes.35 The net result of this draft law and the state’s 
commitment to it, Gorbachev hoped, would be to “bring Lenin’s ideas on cooperatives into 
the present day.”36
Following this speech, numerous Soviet reformers placed themselves squarely 
behind the cooperative movement. This list included the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, 
the ideologist Georgi Smirnov, and the historian Yuri Afanasyev.37 But the person who 
argued most cogently for the development of cooperatives was Nikolai Ryzhkov, who was 
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers at the time (1988). In a speech given to the 
Deputies of the Supreme Soviet, Ryzhkov elaborated on the contributions which
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cooperatives could make to the advancement of perestroika and the immediate improvement 
of the Soviet economy.
Ryzhkov began his speech by stating that cooperatives were inherently appealing to
the Soviet people because they provided their members with material incentives and the
general population with desirable consumer goods. He also argued that cooperatives “by
nature” were responsive to market fluctuations, and that this attribute made them essential
to the task of recreating a socialist market like that which existed during the NEP. He
further posited that cooperatives were catalysts for scientific and technological innovations.
Finally, he claimed that cooperatives were a significant source of socialist renewal, which
could help lift the malaise which had enveloped the Soviet population during the last years
of the stagnant Brezhnev leadership.38 For these reasons, Ryzhkov boldly declared:
The expansion of cooperative activity is not just the latest tribute 
to fashion, not some temporary zigzag of politics, but a vital 
requirement for our further progress along the path of projected 
social and economic transformations.39
Although Ryzhkov’s speech was received well in general by the Supreme Soviet, 
there was one aspect of it which generated great debate: the taxation of cooperatives. The 
proposal called for a progressive income tax, ranging from 30 to 90 percent, to be applied 
to all cooperative members earning over 500 rubles per month. Numerous deputies from 
both chambers of the Supreme Soviet voiced dissatisfaction with this proposal, and their 
protest was taken seriously enough to have included in the cooperative law only broad 
guidelines for taxation.40
After this amendment of the draft law, which ultimately made local authorities the 
sole beneficiary of cooperative taxation and which encouraged them to grant cooperatives 
tax breaks, the Supreme Soviet voted unanimously in favor of the Law on Cooperatives, 
and it went into effect on July 1,1988. This law established that cooperatives were one of 
the fundamental elements of the Soviet socialist economy and that they were allowed to
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engage in any activity not proscribed by USSR or republican legislation. The law also 
required local state officials to coordinate with cooperatives so that these enterprises could 
draw up their own five-year operating and budgetary plans. Further, the law permitted 
cooperatives to price their goods and services according to market supply and demand 
except when the state purchased the product or when the cooperative output was made with 
state-supplied natural resources or acquired through the central allocation system.41
Following the enactment of this law, many individuals decided to join or form 
cooperatives. Prior to the passage of the Law on Cooperatives by the Supreme Soviet, only 
about 14,000 cooperatives existed, and they produced a mere 350 million rubles worth of 
goods and services, or .1 percent of the Soviet national product. However, by January 1, 
1989, some 77,500 cooperatives employing approximately 1,392,000 people were 
registered with the state, and they produced 6 billion rubles worth of output, or 1 percent 
of the Soviet national product. In 1989, cooperative activity grew at an even greater rate.
As of July 1, 1989, 133,000 cooperatives employing 2,900,000 people existed in the 
USSR, and they produced 12.9 billion rubles worth of goods and services, or 3 percent of 
the Soviet national product. Considering that the 2,900,000 people working for 
cooperatives by July 1989 represented only 1.5 percent of the Soviet labor force, their 
output level was quite exceptional42
The marked success of the cooperatives did more than just help bolster the Soviet 
economy. It created a highly prosperous group of people, and this group drew the ire of 
many Soviet citizens. After decades of egalitarian wage leveling, people resented the fact 
that cooperative workers could earn salaries which dwarfed those given by the state. 
(According to statistics revealed for the fourth quarter of 1988, the average monthly wage 
for cooperative workers was 406 rubles before distribution of profits while that of state 
employees was only 217 rubles.43 People were especially infuriated about this wage
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differential because they felt that it was created in large part by the exorbitant prices charged 
by cooperatives for their goods and services.44
The public made their dissatisfaction with perceived cooperative price gouging 
known in several ways. First, in several polls taken in 1988, large numbers of people 
expressed reservations about cooperatives. Second, many citizens wrote to local and 
national Soviet newspapers and complained about the “unjustified incomes” of cooperative 
employees. Finally, in various republics, violent “pogroms” began to be carried out 
against cooperatives.45 Seizing upon this public hostility towards cooperatives, 
conservative elements within the Soviet leadership lobbied for legislation restricting the 
sphere of activities in which cooperatives could participate. While a resolution towards this 
end was passed, a closer look at the processes involved and the results achieved will show 
that the reformers actually dictated the pace and scope of cooperative restrictions.
To begin with, many of Gorbachev’s allies, including Ryzhkov, recognized that, in light of 
public resentment towards cooperatives, some restrictions on non-state-owned businesses 
needed to be enacted to signal to all that rampant capitalism would not come to dominate the 
Soviet economy. Further, Gorbachev selected numerous experts in the fields of 
economics, law, sociology, and medicine to speak about the necessity of adopting a 
resolution which prevented cooperatives from engaging in activities which threatened 
public safety. Specifically, these experts argued that some cooperatives were selling goods 
and services which either were already illegal or which were harmful to Soviet citizens, and 
these experts asserted that the state could publish a list of forbidden activities which would 
not affect many cooperatives and which would benefit society greatly 46 Thus, as one of 
their last acts of 1988, the Council of Ministers issued a decree which precluded 
cooperatives from engaging in such dubious endeavors as production of moonshine, 
narcotics, and weapons, and which applied to an estimated one percent of 
existing cooperatives.47
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Recreating Diverse Forms of Socialist Property
In fact, the legislation restricting cooperative activities did not really deter aspiring 
entrepreneurs. In the first quarter of 1989, 21,800 new cooperatives were formed, and the 
entire cooperative sector contributed 4.3 billion rubles worth of goods and services to the 
Soviet economy. An additional 43,700 cooperatives were created in the second quarter of 
1989, and, together with already existing cooperatives, they helped produce 8.6 billion 
rubles worth of output, which was twice as great as the first quarter figure for 1989 and 
nearly 50 percent greater than the yearly statistic for 1988.48 These trends convinced 
Gorbachev that it was politically possible and economically necessary to encourage 
cooperatives to expand their scale of operations and to increase popular support for 
economic pluralism.
Gorbachev began his quest for new legislation to promote continued development 
of cooperatives at the March 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In his 
opening speech to the Plenum, Gorbachev declared that a new agrarian policy was needed 
to improve the Soviet food situation, and that the bases for this policy could be discerned 
by studying the agricultural history of the USSR. He then recounted the successes of the 
NEP and the failures of collectivization, and contended that the degree of voluntariness 
upon which the two policies were predicated was the primary reason for the opposite 
results they achieved. Whereas peasants were allowed to decide freely about joining a 
cooperative under the NEP, their land was expropriated and they were forced to work on 
state-controlled collective farms under Stalin’s leadership 49
According to Gorbachev, the effect of collectivization was the “alienation of rural 
toilers from (their) property.”50 In order to “resolutely overcome this alienation,” he 
advocated a “restructuring of economic relations in the countryside.”51 He argued that this 
“restructuring” could be accomplished only if the state recognized “the equality of different 
forms of socialist ownership of the means of production” and if peasants were offered
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“broad opportunities for showing independence, enterprise, and initiative”.52 In 
Gorbachev’s opinion, leasing represented one of the best ways for promoting agricultural 
restructuring, because it was through leasing that “Lenin’s idea of the active involvement of 
personal interest can be realized most fully and people’s sense of proprietorship restored to 
them.”53 Consequently, Gorbachev proposed that a law on leasing be created.54
During the summer of 1989, a resolution on leasing was drafted and, in the 
autumn, it was submitted for public discussion. One of the people who most cogently 
argued for the institutionalization of leasing was Vadim Medvedev, then-chairman of the 
Central Committee Ideological Commission. Specifically, Medvedev contended that 
leasing was a very desirable property type for Soviet society for two reasons. First, 
leasing could provide significant worker incentives, and, second, it was still a socialized 
form of ownership by virtue of the fact that the state functioned as “landlord.”55
After receiving the support of the CPSU Central Committee, the leasing resolution 
was debated at the November session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Pavel Bunich, Vice- 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Joint Committee on Questions of the Economic Reform, 
proposed the resolution. The draft law stated that lessees could be state organizations, 
cooperatives, individual labor concerns, or groups of Soviet citizens. Concerning land, the 
law stated that lessees could lease land for periods of five years to life. If the lessee died 
during the term of the lease, the lease could be passed on to another member of the leasing 
group, and upon expiration of the lease, the lessee group would have first claim on a 
renewed lease on the property in question. The proposed leasing law also included 
provisions allowing workers to lease equipment from an enterprise in return for a fee or a 
contractually-agreed upon output level to be delivered to the lessor. Similarly, an 
enterprise could lease itself from a superior ministry and could fulfill the lease contract by 
meeting target figures set by the state or by paying a rent.56
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To gamer support for the resolution, Bunich asserted that the proposed law on 
leasing would promote socialist renewal and economic revival. According to Bunich, the 
resolution would contribute to the former goal by allowing Soviet citizens to reclaim 
ownership of their land and their labor, and to the latter goal by increasing worker 
productivity and state revenues.57 Despite Bunich’s arguments, criticism of the draft law 
came from both dogmatic Communists and market-oriented reformers in the Supreme 
Soviet. The former group was led by Mikhail Safin, who argued that better equipment and 
more investment for state and collective farms was all that was needed to improve Soviet 
agriculture, not a law promoting the breakup of socialist farms. In contrast, radical 
reformers led by Anatoly Sobchak posited that the proposed law did not give citizens 
sufficient ownership rights.58
Alexander Nikonov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet’s Joint Committee on 
Agrarian Questions and Food did much to reduce the concerns of both groups. To relieve 
the fears of old guard Communists, he cited statistics which showed that there were 
numerous state and collective farms which were successful and which were not in jeopardy 
of being broken up. To win the votes of the radical reformers, he recommended that the 
leasing law be voted on with the stipulation that a law on property be developed to 
complement the leasing law. The result of Nikonov’s maneuvering was the passage of the 
leasing law by a vote of 268 to 71, with 30 abstentions 59
Following passage of the leasing law, Gorbachev immediately assigned Leonid 
Abalkin, one of his closest economic advisors, to draft a bill on property. Before actually 
designing legislation, however, Abalkin chose to justify ideologically the existence of 
diverse property forms within the USSR. He undertook this task at a special conference on 
economic reform held in late November 1989. In his keynote address to this All-Union 
Theoretical and Practical Conference, Abalkin contended that objective analysis of “the 
concept of socialism that V.I. Lenin arrived at in the last years of his life” revealed that “the
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diversity of forms of public ownership is not a transitional stage but the normal state of the 
socialist economy.”60 Proceeding from this statement, he posited that it was necessary to 
transform unprofitable state enterprises “into leaseholding, cooperative, joint-stock, private 
(based on individual labor activity) and mixed enterprises.”61
After this conference, Abalkin began constructing a legal framework for the 
existence of diverse property forms in the USSR. Under Abalkin’s draft legislation, 
property could be owned by citizens, cooperatives, the state, and foreign investors.62 In 
February 1990, the Central Committee voted to include Abalkin’s property proposals in the 
platform it would present to the Twenty-Eighth Congress of the CPSU in July.63 Then, 
following this vote of Party confidence, Abalkin campaigned for Supreme Soviet passage 
of the draft law on property ownership. On March 6,1990, after relatively little debate, the 
Supreme Soviet approved the 34—article resolution on property, and Mikhail Gorbachev 
signed it into law.64 Finally, the Law on Property in the USSR went into effect on 
July 1, 1990.
Evaluating Perestroika
The preceding examination of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform efforts reveal several 
facts. First, from the time that he was made Central Committee Secretary responsible for 
agriculture in 1978, he recognized that decades of collectivization policy had stifled the 
creative initiative of Soviet farmers, and, as he became more familiar with other sectors of 
the economy, he realized that this problem plagued virtually all types of Soviet workers. 
Second, in response to this problem, Gorbachev tried to increase worker incentives 
through a variety of reforms, and the one in which he placed the greatest hope was the 
reinstitutionalization of cooperatives. Third, to win support for his market-oriented 
reforms, he referred to Lenin’s last writings and the experience of the NEP as a way of 
demonstrating that diverse forms of ownership were meant to exist under socialism. 
Conversely, to reshape further the opinions of Soviet citizens about non-state economic
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activity, Gorbachev portrayed Stalin’s forced collectivization as a gross deviation from 
Leninist ideals. Clearly, Gorbachev’s reinterpretation of Lenin’s writings on the NEP and 
his repudiation of Stalinism indicated that he was an advocate of the CPSU’s gradualist 
tradition. Moreover, Gorbachev attempted to advance the gradualist cause by emphasizing 
leasing as a preferred form of socialist property.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout its history, the Bolshevik Party has claimed to base its program of 
action on the teachings of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin. Since the Bolshevik Party, later 
renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), has governed the USSR for 
more than seventy years, two facts about the Soviet political system can be discerned from 
the above assertion. First, Soviet leaders, to varying degrees, have used ideology as a 
policy-making criterion, and second, the writings of Marx and Lenin have been used to 
establish a standard against which to evaluate the ideological legitimacy of specific Soviet 
policies. By examining the views of Marx and Lenin on cooperatives and analyzing the 
economic programs of Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev relating to these worker 
collectives, much can be learned about the ways in which Soviet leaders have used 
ideology to formulate and implement policy.
First, the conditions under which Marx and Lenin thought cooperatives could 
contribute to the construction of socialism can be identified. Second, the motivations of 
Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev for introducing cooperative reform programs can be 
discovered. Third, the functions which these three Soviet leaders hoped ideology would 
serve in the promotion of these programs can be ascertained. Fourth, the degree of fidelity 
to Marxism-Leninism embodied in the different cooperative policies espoused by 
Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev can be measured. Finally, some ways of legitimately 
developing Marxism-Leninism can be distinguished.
Marx expressed great optimism in the socialist potential of cooperatives because 
they involved all cooperative members in the production process and provided for a more
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equitable distribution of assets than did capitalist firms. However, for cooperatives to 
contribute meaningfully to the construction of socialist society, Marx argued that political 
power had to be in the hands of the proletariat and that cooperatives had to be expanded on 
a nationwide scale. But, at no time, Marx proclaimed, should coercion be used by a 
socialist government to compel individuals to join cooperatives. In Marx’s opinion, it was 
the voluntary nature and economic independence that cooperatives possessed which made 
them such a socially desirable labor form.
In his writings, Lenin frequently praised Marx for his recognition of the usefulness 
of cooperatives in building socialism and asserted that, upon their seizure of power in 
Russia, the Bolsheviks would work to establish a network of producers’ and consumers’ 
cooperatives. Even during the trying times of the Russian Civil War, Lenin reaffirmed his 
intention of making voluntary cooperatives one of the foundations of Soviet socialist 
society. After the Bolsheviks’ triumph in the Civil War, Lenin attempted to honor this 
commitment by introducing the New Economic Policy (NEP) as a means of creating a 
market socialist economy. As the NEP helped alleviate the devastation left by the Civil War 
and cooperatives proved themselves to be economically productive, Lenin recommended 
that a market socialist economy be maintained indefinitely and that cooperatives be 
promoted as a way of helping peasants develop into socialism.
Largely due to the positive assessments on cooperatives provided by Marx and 
Lenin, three subsequent Soviet leaders chose to make worker collectives a vital component 
of their economic programs. However, the ways in which each leader intended 
cooperatives to contribute to the improvement of the Soviet society varied significantly. 
Nikolai Bukharin, the Bolshevik who most influenced Soviet policy immediately following 
the death of Lenin, advocated the continuation of state support for voluntary and 
independent cooperatives because he wanted to promote the gradual development into 
socialism that Lenin had recommended. Josef Stalin, who had Bukharin removed from
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power, rejected this strategy and instead attempted to build socialism rapidly by making all 
economic entities, including cooperatives, subservient to the state. Finally, more than 
thirty years after the death of Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a campaign to give more 
incentives and autonomy to cooperatives in an effort to reconstruct Soviet socialism into a 
form resembling that envisioned by Lenin and Bukharin.
Although Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev had markedly different goals for 
cooperatives to fulfill, each of the three leaders claimed that he was basing his program on 
Marxism-Leninism. While Bukharin and Gorbachev asserted that they were attempting to 
execute the gradualist legacy left by Lenin in his last writings, Stalin referred to some of 
Lenin’s earlier pieces on the NEP, in which the first Soviet leader depicted the NEP as a 
temporary retreat from socialism, as a means of defending his attempt to build socialism 
rapidly. Stalin further justified his decision to implement mass collectivization by arguing 
that Marx’s theory of class warfare necessitated that the Soviet government liquidate the 
kulaks, a semi-capitalist element that had allegedly come to dominate the countryside, in 
order to be able to construct socialism.
In addition to serving as a source of motivation for the three leaders, Marxism- 
Leninism was used in other ways by Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev. First, all three 
leaders won approval for their cooperative policies within the CPSU by presenting them as 
vehicles for realizing the goals of Marx and Lenin. Second, the three leaders explained 
their cooperative programs to the public in ideological terms to demonstrate their dedication 
to the task of building socialism, a tactic which they hoped would lend political legitimacy 
to the Soviet government. Finally, Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev relied on ideological 
campaigns to inspire Soviet citizens to participate in and support cooperatives.
However, while Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev all portrayed themselves as 
legitimate executors of the wills of Marx and Lenin, close examination reveals that this was 
not the case. Regarding cooperatives, it is evident that only Bukharin and Gorbachev
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faithfully adhered to Marxist-Leninist ideals. They promoted the development of voluntary 
and independent cooperatives and advocated that there be a system of equivalent exchange 
between the state and the cooperatives, and they recognized that these objectives required a 
long-term commitment to a market socialist economy. On the other hand, it is abundantly 
clear that Stalin deviated from the Marxist-Leninist course. By choosing to collectivize the 
peasantry, Stalin violated the principle against forcibly expropriating peasants established 
by Marx and Lenin. Further, in creating equal wages for all cooperative workers, Stalin 
abandoned the Marxist-Leninist precept that citizens of a socialist society should be able to 
earn according to their work.
In counterpoint to Stalin’s perversion of Marxism-Leninism, Bukharin and 
Gorbachev provide examples of how Soviet ideology can be expanded legitimately. 
Bukharin contributed to the development of Marxism-Leninism through theoretical 
discourse. Specifically, Bukharin’s idea that cooperatives could help peasants grow into 
socialism through the contacts that these enterprises made with other socialist institutions 
increased CPSU support for independent worker collectives and encouraged the state bank 
to provide the financial assistance necessary for the cooperatives to flourish. Gorbachev 
added to Soviet ideology by adapting Marxism-Leninism to the current conditions of the 
USSR. In particular, Gorbachev argued that for cooperatives to help Soviet socialism 
continue to evolve positively, the state needed to institutionalize a regulated market and a 
plurality of forms of ownership, with leasing being given a preferential status.
In summation, then, the preceding analysis of the beliefs of Marx and Lenin 
concerning cooperatives and programs relating to worker collectives devised and 
implemented by Bukharin, Stalin, and Gorbachev reveal several important facts about 
Marxism-Leninism and its role in the Soviet political system. First, Marx and Lenin 
believed that voluntary and autonomous cooperatives were vital to the construction of 
socialism. Second, the forced collectivization campaign executed by Stalin thus actually
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represented a gross deviation from Marxism-Leninism, while the cooperative policies 
espoused by Bukharin and Gorbachev in fact were efforts to realize the vision of Marx and 
Lenin. Third, the attempts by Bukharin and Gorbachev to revitalize the Soviet economy 
through the promotion of cooperatives suggest that ideology can be a source of inspiration 
for Soviet leaders. Fourth, the theories and policies conceived of by Bukharin and 
Gorbachev to help bolster cooperatives show that Marxism-Leninsm can be creatively 
developed. Finally, the fact that Bukharin and Gorbachev chose to justify their cooperative 
programs to both the CPSU and the people indicate that Soviet leaders feel that ideology is 
an important legitimating tool.
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